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Abstract: To provide foundations for human rights is to prove coherence between focus (what we are 
talking about when we talk about human rights) and form (in what way we think human rights have a claim to 
necessity).  This paper describes some permissible combinations of form and focus.  This approach to 
foundations can also be shown to reconcile two propositions that might otherwise be assumed to be 
contradictory.  On the one hand, we should reject the notion of a ‘definitive’ justification.  On the other, we 
should admit the intelligibility of strong, moral, foundations for human rights.       
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is the contention of this paper that, despite recent attacks on the notion, the idea of 
‘foundations’ for human rights remains philosophically decisive.  The idea of foundations 
for human rights should be seen as the requirement of coherence in an account of human 
rights’ nature and necessity.  It must, then, be an associated task of the paper to show why 
‘non-foundational’ philosophies of human rights are conceptually mistaken.  
 
One initial concern here might be whether the concept of foundations is able to 
transcend, rather than beg the question of, different disciplinary commitments.  After all, 
our disciplines –law, ethics, political theory, history and others– themselves have 
foundational commitments that determine what is knowledge, certainty, or truth.  So, when 
different disciplines produce markedly different accounts of human rights this is both 
evidence of the inherent instability of the subject matter and evidence of decisive 
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epistemological differences between methodologically distinct disciplines.
2
  Any talk of 
‘foundations’ for human rights would, therefore, be the product of these different initial 
commitments.  
 
Nonetheless, to analyse human rights we must, regardless of our other 
commitments, commit ourselves to showing what is being explained or justified, and how 
this is being explained or justified.  No account of human rights –no account that has 
reasonable claim to be an account of human rights– lacks both conceptual commitments 
and normative commitments.  The meaning of ‘foundations’, whatever else it means, must 
be understood as an assertion of how these two components, conceptual and normative, can 
be made coherent.  So, there will no doubt be disciplinary differences in what aspects of the 
phenomenon of human rights we choose to be central.  But unless we are committed to the 
belief that the language of human rights is nonsense and the practice of human rights is 
meaningless, the task of human rights is theory is explore to what degree there is coherence 
between our practices and our obligations.  In this respect, and more generally, the present 
paper is represents a critique of recent non-, or anti-, foundational work on human rights.
3
   
 
I proceed by way of the language and meaning of ‘foundations’ in general and 
‘foundations’ in the context of human rights in particular.  This reveals a potential 
mismatch between deployment of foundations in social explanation and the use of 
foundations in the explanation of human rights.  Turning to contemporary philosophies of 
human rights to consider the source and significance of this mismatch, coherence between 
form and focus is defended as the common standard by which these philosophies should be 
judged.  It is concluded that it is inescapable, in analysis of human rights, to draw upon the 
idea of foundations-as-coherence.     
 
 
II. FOUNDATIONS 
 
What is it to make a claim concerning ‘foundations’?  Part metaphor, and part 
discipline-relative term of art, a general characterisation would be analysis concerning the 
conditions or structures that make something stable or enduring.  It is possible but 
exceptional to identify a foundation without qualifications: ‘the foundation of mathematics 
                                                        
2
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is logic’; ‘the foundation of success is a good breakfast’.  Foundational analysis will more 
often be qualified.  We might say ‘such foundations will only be stable if….’  We might 
say ‘part of this practice has its foundation in x, but not other parts’.  These qualifications 
allow the possibility of different foundations existing alongside, or underlying, the ones we 
have identified.  They speak to the difference that perspective makes; there may be other 
perspectives revealing other defensible foundational claims.      
 
More specifically, in identifying a foundation for a social practice we commonly 
imply that x is being made intelligible from an ‘internal’ point of view but not in the same 
way from an ‘external’ point of view.4  For example, actions have a foundation in the sense 
of there being conscious reasons for their taking place but this is not the sole explanatory 
perspective: ‘the religious foundations of this ritual are found in scriptural passages, but the 
social foundation is group survival’.  Generally, when we make a claim concerning 
foundations we are making a claim intending to explain something’s necessity, i.e. some or 
all of its causes.  But it is also characteristic of discussion of foundations that these need not 
be sufficient conditions to be considered foundational, and nor need they imply a single, 
authoritative, epistemological perspective.
5
   
 
So, far from always implying axiomatic (or apodictic or self-evident), different uses 
of foundation suggest that we more commonly look to both its form and its focus.  First, we 
have regard to the form of the foundational claim.  Is something said to possess an origin, 
or have a reason for its endurance, or have the capacity for enduring change?  We can ask 
of this form whether it amounts to explanation or justification.  That is, whether it identifies 
causes or necessity (explanation), or whether it identifies causes or necessity and in doing 
so treats only one kind of necessity as ultimately necessity-conferring or law-like 
(justification).
6
  Second, we must also have regard to the focus of the claim.  Is it intended 
to be complete and exhaustive?  Or is it partial, aspiring to give foundations only to part of 
a larger phenomenon? 
 
How, then, are human rights and foundations related?  Their foundations are of 
philosophical concern but talk of foundations accompanies human rights wherever they are, 
politically or legally, at issue.  Such discussions often concern moral foundations.  Some 
may be concerned with the historical pedigree or historical continuity of human rights.  
Others involve solving practical problems in the interpretation of human rights.  
Foundations play a greater or a lesser role in a number of practical and philosophical 
                                                        
4
 For two different renderings of this distinction see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 Edition 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994) and Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1998). 
5
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London, 1971).  On the second see Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy 
(Routledge: London, 2012). 
6
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Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and von Wright (1971, p. 137f). 
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contexts, and variation in the meaning and function of ‘foundations’ is apt, at the very least, 
to give rise to the suspicion that its meaning is context-dependent.
7
          
 
That problem, which is the core analytical concern of this paper, might be stated as 
follows.  Explaining the foundations of social practices usually take the form of identifying 
composite causal conditions relating to a loosely defined or dynamic phenomenon.
8
  The 
foundation of human rights is, however, frequently treated as a singular phenomenon, and 
discussion of human rights characteristically treats human rights themselves as a singular 
phenomenon.  Does this entail that there is a mistaken tendency towards reductionism in 
analysis of human rights or, conversely, that the foundations relevant to human rights 
admit or require more precision than is characteristic of social explanation?  This is a 
variation on longstanding discussions relating to ‘foundationalism’ and ‘functionalism’, but 
the present enquiry is intended to achieve more clarity on the predominant uses of 
‘foundation’ in contemporary debate.9  More importantly, it is argued that the epistemology 
related to the idea of a foundation can be put in much sharper focus by pursuing a question 
that keeps conceptual and methodological problems at the fore.  There is a temptation to 
assume that if we face problems in identifying the focus or object of foundation then 
epistemological priority must be given to pragmatic modes of explanation.
10
  I intend to 
show that this is based on too hasty dismissal of the question of focus, which in turn 
encourages too hasty a dismissal of ‘strong’ foundational arguments.  Nonetheless, for any 
foundational argument some unity in ‘human rights’ – be it conceptual or functional – must 
be defended.  How has this been approached in contemporary debates on foundations? 
 
 
III. CONTEMPORARY FOUNDATIONAL DEBATES 
 
It is possible to identify two markers that signal the poles of contemporary debates.  
Gewirth’s work from the 1970s and 1980s on morality and human rights, and Rawls’ work 
from the 1990s on international law and politics.
11
  The details of these works will be 
considered in passing, but the poles of debate that they represent are of more immediate 
importance.  Crudely, an idealised picture of human rights faces a practical one.  Or put 
                                                        
7
 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) provides the most important 
reference point here but Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
provides an important, contrasting, response.  The differences between these kinds of analyses are, as the 
general argument of this paper seeks to make explicit, simultaneously methodological, epistemological, and 
normative. 
8
 von Wright (1971, pp. 136-138). 
9
 For relevant analysis of the existing currents of thought, and for conclusions close to the present paper, see 
John Tasioulas, “Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights”, Current Legal Problems 65(1) (2012): 1-30. 
10
 See in particular Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality” in S. Shute & S. Hurley 
(eds), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 
11
 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago & London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982).  John Rawls (1999). 
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another way, an epistemologically pragmatic, and in certain respects ‘realist’ political 
philosophy (Rawls), confronts a systematic philosophy claiming logical connection 
between moral necessity, practical necessity, and the nature of the human (Gewirth).  
 
Synthesis between these positions might be desirable and intelligible.  Two 
examples will concern me, Waldron’s and Griffin’s.  Waldron considers his account 
‘foundation-ish’.12  He equates ‘foundations proper’ with axioms from which a theory can 
be deduced in its entirety, a model of foundation he considers inappropriate in this 
context.
13
  However, he does believe that his account of dignity and human rights, turning 
on the significance of status in democratic societies, is sufficiently foundational because 
status/dignity has good fit with certain important background assumptions concerning 
respect and recognition in law.  Within democratic societies that respect the rationality of 
the individual all rational individuals are automatic and equal rights holder.  ‘Dignity’ 
expresses this elevated status of the individual within a democratic society.
14
 
 
Griffin, in his twin ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach, draws together ideas of 
moral necessity and personhood with the (pragmatic and principled) commitment to leave 
intact existing legal practices associated with justice.
15
  Moral necessity must bend at some 
point to this practical and principled necessity, and some aspects of personhood that could 
be considered human rights concerns are, for Griffin, better treated as rights within the 
normal legal practices associated with justice.  This “is reinforced […] by the most 
consequential statements about human rights in our time: the Universal Declaration of 1948 
and virtually all subsequent documents of national and international law of human rights. 
These documents include procedural justice but not all of distributive justice, or of 
retributive justice, or of many forms of fairness.” 16    Griffin therefore bridges moral 
necessity and practice by treating personhood as a foundational concept with expansive 
consequences while accepting that another foundational notion, justice, must be allowed to 
coexist alongside personhood and human rights.  Griffin must be distanced from Waldron 
by his clear separation of constitutional and human rights, and be distanced from Gewirth 
in his treatment of human rights as an essentially contested concept.
17
 
 
The Rawlsian position is here represented by Raz.  For Raz no analytical 
significance can be attributed to ‘human rights’.18  We must then, like Rawls, turn to the 
                                                        
12
 Waldron (2013a, p. 5). 
13
 Waldron (2013a, pp.17-18). 
14
 “Similarly, we may say of ‘‘dignity’’ that the term is used to convey something about the status of human 
beings and that it is also and concomitantly used to convey the demand that status should actually be 
respected.”  Jeremy Waldron, “Dignity and Rank”, European Journal of Sociology 48(2) (2007): pp. 201-237, 
at 205. 
15
 Griffin (2008, p. 41f). 
16
 Griffin (2008, p. 273). 
17
 Griffin (2008, p. 4) also Griffin (2001, pp. 306-327).   
18
 Raz (2010, pp. 336-337). 
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focal example of human rights –that of international, not domestic, law– where at least the 
language of human rights is prevalent.  We should substitute Griffin’s generalisations about 
personhood for individual interests so pressing that they will commonly take the form of 
‘moral rights’.  Such interests can but do not necessarily become claims against the state.  
In the international arena there are potentially arguments to justify (given a certain quantity 
and quality of interference with such rights, and given that state inviolability is not 
absolute) one state taking action against another to enforce them.  “[J]ust as rights generally 
while being reasons for taking some measures against their violators do not normally give 
reason for all measures, so human rights set limits to sovereignty, but do not necessarily 
constitute reasons for all measures, however severe, against violators.”19  Consequently, 
human rights are to be understood as an aspect of international legal discourse that depend 
for their efficacy on the acceptance of hypothetical imperatives that are themselves subject 
to existing international political and legal conditions.  In essence, moral necessity is 
substituted for certain pro tanto reasons characteristic of international relations, and human 
rights, as political rights, have no foundations only conditions of efficacy.
20
 
 
The mixture of epistemological, methodological, and normative commitments 
represented here is clearly problematic.  It is liable to suggest that comparison or 
adjudication between these positions is senseless because of radical differences in their 
normative commitments, or perhaps that our assessment will be dependent upon whether 
we have a strong intuition that a particular form of human rights practice is or should be 
focal in analysis.  The following sections are intended to show that two components of 
human rights analysis are constant: form and focus.  The remainder of the paper is intended 
to show that they are both necessary in analysis of human rights and represent the basis of 
foundational claims.   
 
IV. FOUNDATIONAL FORM 
 
Recalling our principal analytical question –do the foundations relevant to human 
rights admit or require more precision than is characteristic of social explanation?– our 
present concern is with what forms of foundation might be admitted or required in relation 
to human rights.  This will involve simplified models of the positions outlined above.  I 
identify ‘strong foundations’ with the claim that a foundation for human rights is necessary 
and can be identified.  ‘Qualified foundations’ implies a claim that a foundation for human 
rights is necessary, that a foundation can be identified, but that this foundation may not be 
wholly intelligible.  A ‘deflationary’ position implies that while foundational claims are 
characteristic of the concept, it is possible that more than one foundational position can be 
defensible in conceptualising human rights.  ‘Anti-foundational’ is the position that any 
foundational claim is dissoluble into necessary conditions that can never, alone, supply 
sufficient conditions. 
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‘Strong’ foundational arguments must take the form that human rights presuppose x 
as a singular, necessity conferring, principle.  This presupposition may concern 
epistemological or moral necessity; this might be derived from deductions, transcendental 
deductions, or dialectically necessary arguments.
21
  The common characteristic is a 
singular, necessary, foundation that is identifiable.  Whether this must necessarily exclude 
all other epistemological perspectives on the foundation is a question to be deferred.
22
  But 
only one principle has justificatory power vis-à-vis human rights.  Other perspectives, then, 
will render only part of human rights intelligible as normative phenomena, or they will fail 
to make them intelligible at all.  The strong foundationalist is likely to be associated with at 
least one example of a human right, typically the right to life, as an example showing 
linkage between foundational necessity and at least one human right that is the product of 
that foundation.
23
  
 
‘Qualified’ foundational arguments make foundations necessary but not sufficient 
for the defensibility of human rights.  Waldron is a case in point where human dignity, as a 
‘status concept’, provides the condition for human rights to be understood as necessary.24    
Human rights are ‘contained’ within that status notion.  On the other hand it may be that 
human dignity itself has a ground or foundation that requires further explanation.
25
  The 
pivotal claim here is the existence of a singular foundation, but a foundation that can be 
understood in different ways and that makes it possible for human rights to be explained in 
different ways.  From one perspective human rights can be seen as directly founded on 
human dignity itself.  From other perspectives our human rights need no talk of foundations 
at all because they function like, and within, the context of ‘normal’ legal norms.  Here 
human rights are likely to be close to constitutional rights as ‘apex’ norms within legal 
systems but with human rights distinguished by the possibility of appeal to foundations 
different to those of other constitutional rights.
26
     
 
‘Deflationary’ foundational arguments admit the relevance of talk about foundations 
but does not commit to any single view of necessity.  Thus we could, like Griffin, talk 
about a foundation or foundations (personhood and/or human dignity) and insist that these 
                                                        
21
 For a cognitivist example see, Matthias Mahlmann, “An Introduction to the Mentalist Theory of Ethics and 
Law”, in Pattaro (et al, eds), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence: Treatise 2 
Foundations of Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), p. 84. 
22
 For instance, it is unclear whether ‘the generic conditions agency’, the foundational notion in Gewirth’s 
work, can be considered synonymous with ‘human dignity’, these might be the same principle from two 
perspectives. 
23
 Alan Gewirth, “Are There Any Absolute Rights?”, The Philosophical Quarterly 31(122) (1981): pp. 1-16. 
24
 Waldron (2007). 
25
 Waldron (2013, p. 12) also Sen on freedom as human rights’ foundational principle (Sen, A. ‘Elements of a 
Theory of Human Rights’ 32(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs (2004) pp. 315-356 at p. 323). 
26
 Jeremy Waldron, “How Law Protects Dignity”, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-
83, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973341> [last accessed 16/07/14] (December 2011).  This characterisation also 
partially captures core elements of Griffin’s work, but Griffin’s relationship with foundations is more 
complex and ‘deflationary’.  
STEPHEN RILEY 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 4 (June 2015) pp. 138-157    ISSN: 2340-9592 
 
145 
are essential aspects of the discourse of human rights.
27
  Nonetheless, ‘necessity’ itself is to 
be understood as complex and qualified.  Griffin is concerned with the necessary conditions 
of personhood (qua moral necessity), the necessity of human rights themselves (qua 
minimum content of natural law within positive law), and the necessity of acknowledging 
the claims of justice as a corrective to the inflationary tendencies of human rights.
28
  The 
foundations of human rights are the interplay of these factors, but that necessity is complex, 
works at a number of (normative and practical) levels, and accommodates the various 
perspectives relevant to human rights given that they are a dynamic phenomenon to which 
no single meaning can be attached.  This kind of account is likely to point to the importance 
of both civil and political, and social and economic rights, to demonstrate that different 
kinds of foundational necessity are needed.
29
 
 
Finally, an ‘anti-foundation’ position would stress the contingent conjunction of a 
number of factors in the existence of human rights.  We can reconstruct their uses in legal, 
political and other discourses such that salient features and certain preconditions are 
identifiable.  But such preconditions do not amount to foundations because they do not 
amount to a singular necessity that links our discourse with our norms.
30
  This is likely to 
privilege efficacious instances of human rights.  The paradigm example of human rights in 
this instance would be those international human rights laws that most clearly overlap with 
humanitarian intervention as the international practice of responding militarily to ‘gross 
human rights violations’.31  
 
These are four possible models of foundational forms.  None, in the form presented, 
obviously fails to be a foundational analysis.  This is partly because the language of 
foundations is imprecise, and partly because none is able to claim priority, qua foundational 
analysis, over the others because each has some explanative power.  Put in terms of the 
question initially posed, human rights can admit significant variation in, but do not appear 
to require, any specific foundational form.  However, if the presence of explanative power 
fails to provide means to adjudicate between the positions, the choice of examples of 
human rights might.  Some examples of human rights (or human rights discourse) seem to 
invite a form of foundational claim.  In fact, in some instances the direction of fit clearly 
                                                        
27
 Compare two of Griffin’s propositions in On Human Rights: “I propose, therefore, only two grounds for 
human rights: personhood and practicalities” (p. 44) and “A satisfactory account of human rights, therefore, 
must contain some adumbration of that exceedingly vague term ‘human dignity’, again not in all of its varied 
uses but in its role as a ground for human rights” (p. 20).  
28
 Griffin (2008, p.13, p.149, p. 256f). 
29
 Henning Hahn, “Justifying Feasibility Constraints on Human Rights”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
15 (2012): pp. 143–157. 
30
 Jeremy Waldron, “Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach”, New York University School of 
Law Working Paper Series No. 13-32 (2013b), as well as Raz’s response (2013). 
31
 See Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians, “Human Rights as Moral Claim Rights” in Rex Martin and 
David A. Reidy (eds) Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (London: Blackwell, 2006).  This contains 
a critical analysis of what Rawls considered to be “human rights proper” (p. 118 and ff). 
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moves from the example itself to the foundation.  Can these differences in focus be 
evaluated independently of the forms that foundational claims take?  This question is 
important because it may be this that has a decisive bearing on what kinds of foundations 
are required for human rights.  I will attempt to show this cannot be answered 
satisfactorily.    
 
 
V. FOUNDATIONAL FOCUS 
 
Recalling again our question –do the foundations relevant to human rights admit or 
require more precision than is characteristic of social explanation?– our concern here is 
what might be ‘relevant’ to or ‘required’ by human rights.  The justification of different 
standards of relevance or different foci presents a problem.  If they are justified as foci in 
their representing the best, politically or legally, justified practice of human rights then this 
is bootstrapping: the product of one form of justification (political or legal justification) 
does not validate such products as standards for all forms of justification.  If they are 
justified as foci in being the ‘dominant’ meaning of human rights then they are begging the 
question.  So, parallel to the dilemma of one or multiple normative perspectives, here we 
face the question of whether there is some conceptual or phenomenological quality that 
must be present in our discussion of human rights in order to ‘save the phenomenon’, or 
whether the necessary or exemplary properties of human rights will always be ‘essentially 
contested’.  This can be illustrated by some of the possible candidates for focal or 
characteristic properties of human rights.  
 
 
V.1. ‘Human Rights’ 
 
Is it possible to talk about the group of human rights without also qualifying this as 
the group of ‘human rights used by lawyers’ or the ‘group of human rights of concern to 
ethicists’?  Could there be some focal phenomenon, or common ground, associated with the 
very term human rights that is necessarily assumed in different practices?  This points to 
more specific, and recurrent, points of contestation: whether there is a shared definition of 
human rights, whether such a concept is susceptible to ‘inflation’ or ‘deflation’, and 
whether its meaning can be stabilised by alignment with ‘moral’ or ‘political’ rights. 
  
The phrase ‘human rights’ itself produces interesting, but arguably tendentious, 
points.  Explaining the foundations of human rights is sometimes construed as pursuit of a 
harmonisation of a contrast between ‘political rights’ and ‘natural rights’ with ‘human 
rights’ either synonymous with the first or superseding the second.32  Neither could be 
considered precisely synonymous with ‘human rights’ itself.  It appears as though human 
rights are intended to be enforced as legal rights (why else would they be called ‘rights’ as 
                                                        
32
 William Talbott’s Which Rights Should be Universal? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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opposed to ‘universal moral duties’ or ‘international aspirations’?).  And ‘human rights’ 
appear to be intended to have authority other than the state itself (why would they be called 
human rights if their existence depended upon the legislative fiat of the state?).  Whether or 
not we set any store on the phrase ‘human rights’ to generate analytically important 
information, it is certainly the case that they have escaped exclusive ownership by legal, 
moral, or political users and commentators.  
 
The language of human rights can be a more precise first point of reference when 
treated as ‘those rights that accrue to humans by virtue of their humanity’.33  This is useful 
in suggesting, at the very least, that human rights should be thought to instantiate value 
rather that be judged solely by their instrumental value.  This is also problematic and the 
definition itself is contentious.  Why might it not denote as rights only those immunities 
that we hold against the state (i.e. humans’ rights are those rights that exist irrespective of 
citizenship)?  Moreover, to have membership of a group with distinctive characteristics 
(humans) is, alone, insufficient to entail a claim to have this characteristic protected.  
 
It is this line of enquiry, not in itself senseless, that nonetheless gives rise to the dual 
threat of ‘deflation’ and ‘inflation’.  Given an imprecise relationship with the human, 
human rights risk being deflated to an empty category unless additional criteria are 
imported to identify what, of significant human importance or of pressing social necessity, 
should be protected by human rights.  Answering this question raises the problem of 
‘inflation’, i.e. the possibility that human rights is so ideologically potent that it becomes 
extended beyond its proper remit.
34
  Some variant of ‘ought implies can’ must then 
accompany human rights.  These limitations must, at the very least, relate to what is 
intelligibly claimable by humans.
35
  Beyond this, and in the absence of additional 
argumentation, ‘human rights’ could be used to denote any desiderata within the sphere of 
human possibility.   
 
In sum, the best focus of interpretation we might be able to extract from this 
analysis is that human rights are intended to be internally self-limiting.  ‘Human rights’ 
cannot reasonably be thought to represent an aspiration to dominate, or provide the means 
to define, the entirety of our normative language and practices.  This is not, however, to 
suggest that anti-inflationists should have an epistemologically decisive voice in 
foundational debates: their choice of focus is important, but neither is this the only focus 
nor does it imply that the correct form of foundation is thereby decided.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33
 See Tasioulas, Gewirth, and Raz (op. cit.) for variations on, and criticisms of, this formulation. 
34
 Gewirth (1986). 
35
 Robert Stern, “Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?”, Utilitas 16(1) (2004): pp. 42-61. 
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V.2. ‘Human Rights’ 
 
This concerns common, general, or valuable properties of the species.  The core 
focus of human rights enquiry should be connection with characteristic capacities of 
humanity, pressing aspects of humanity, or humanity as a cosmopolitan notion.   
 
‘Humanity’ might be related to agency, reason-responsiveness, or self-
constitution.
36
  It suggests we may be able to generate a class of ‘characteristic capacities of 
humanity’, i.e. those interests or powers available to all and only humans.  By extension, 
we may be able to exclude from human rights any and all interests that exist in the absence 
of distinctively human concerns (accepting, therefore, some ‘deflation’).  Conversely, it 
might be that we can extent human rights to all those capable of self-constitution or self-
consciousness (accepting, therefore, some ‘inflation’).  Equally, it may be that 
‘characteristic capacities of humanity’ gives support to the possibility that there is only one 
human right –the right to treatment consonant with the standards implied by ‘humanity’– 
which is dynamic in both its content and its right-holder.     
 
It is more common to attempt to limit human rights scope to ‘pressing aspects of 
human life and agency’.37  This could be construed as respecting human limitations and 
human vulnerabilities; it could imply a threshold for a distinctively or properly human life.  
A ‘threshold’ marks out a basic standard that it is proper to expect within certain practices 
(e.g. a standard of living) or a basic standard that it is proper to apply to certain practices 
(e.g. minimum or minimal thresholds).
38
  Either way, these face the problem of the ‘human’ 
no longer being a value to be instantiated in human rights but a set of standards for which 
human rights have instrumental value alone. 
 
The other option would be humanity as rights-holder or, in other words, the 
cosmopolitan claim that each individual possesses the same rights regardless of their state 
of origin.  Here ‘humanity’ is juxtaposed with ‘citizen’, with the former meaning an object 
trans-national, or international, respect.  Clearly this focus is of particular interest to 
deflationary- and anti-foundational theorists for whom there is a link with an established 
practice, namely humanitarian intervention.  In fact this focus could be thought to have two 
facets: the justification of humanitarian intervention, and a more thoroughgoing 
commitment to moral cosmopolitanism.
39
  It is not clear that the former should be the only 
focus of concern (why should we ignore the mass of domestic and regional human rights 
practices?) and the latter as a deferral of the problem.  That is, are we concerned with 
                                                        
36
 See, inter alia, Jacques Maritain, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain: Selected 
Readings (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1956); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011(1980)); Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
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38
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39
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human rights that are already of trans-national concern, or those that should be of trans-
national concern? 
 
In sum, to take ‘human rights’ as focal is to produce a range of very different 
questions.  What is the meaning of human?  Is humanity a (factual) foundation, a (practical) 
limit to what we understand as human rights, or a (moral) limit to what ends can be served 
by human rights?  And when we focus on humanity and the humanitarian must we 
prioritise international law and if so is this to be taken in its real or ideal form?  These kinds 
of questions lend themselves to wide moral, social and political discussion, which may be 
part of the strength of human rights.  They also point to the fact that any ‘self-limitation’ in 
the concept of human right is difficult to defend.  Human rights are not coextensive with 
our normative concerns, but they come close to touching on most of them.   
 
 
V.3. ‘Human Rights’ 
 
Are we concerned with the whole set of possible legal human rights or a sample of 
typical (or atypical) human rights claims?  This is question-begging but it also points to the 
potential significance of dividing rights that are, and have been, routinely and successfully 
used as claims against the state, from those rights that are difficult to bring, or less 
frequently brought, against the state.  Does such a division signify at least two classes of 
human rights?  The contrast between will and interest theories give us the means to support 
such a division.  Will theories, characterising rights by the capacity to bind the will of 
another agent, trace the normative force of rights to freedom and agency.  Interest theory 
locates their value in the value of the interests that they protect.
40
  Human rights are, in fact, 
often instances of rights brought successfully against states because states have the capacity 
to fulfil such rights (will theory).  Other human rights, less successfully enforced or less 
frequently used, clearly express interests but are less easily seen as duties.  Human rights 
with no obvious correlative duty holder, but having a link to interests, face the criticisms 
that interest theories often face.
41
  We must be in a position to prove that interests are a 
sufficient reason to hold another to be under an obligation.  In the context of state 
responsibilities, and absent a more comprehensive normative theory, this may be difficult to 
prove.   
 
On the will theory, the nature of the duty-holder is crucial in producing the formal, 
legal, property demanded of rights, namely their enforceability against correlative duty-
holders whose choice of action can be constrained or directed.  It is a central problem of 
focus to ask whether we take the typical duty-holder as definitive of human rights (a 
‘vertical’ relationship with the state), or whether other duty-holders, including other private 
                                                        
40
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(1986); for analysis of both see Cruft (2004). 
41
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individuals, are implied by the concept itself (‘horizontal’ effect).42  Fidelity to the existing 
‘complexity’ of human rights suggests that the state should be taken as a central case and 
horizontal effect treated as over-idealisation.  Fidelity to the ‘value’ that human rights 
instantiate suggests that nothing excludes this effect other than the accidental practicalities 
and principles of existing legal systems.  These starting-points, previously problematised as 
epistemologically distinct starting-positions, should also be thought to be normatively 
problematic when they recur, in a modified form, in attempts to reconceptualise human 
rights as ‘moral rights’.43      
 
The meaning and function of any division between legal and moral rights depends 
upon the moral, legal or political context in which the division is used.
44
  Against the 
backdrop of contractarian theory, the division broadly identifies certain aspects of ‘private 
conscience’ (moral rights) that, while nominally excluded by an authoritative legal system 
(legal rights), should be granted respect; this can, but need not, be aligned with the division 
between self- and other-regarding duties.
45
  The same division would have a very different 
function against a natural law backdrop where the opposition indicates that some moral 
rights have, rightly, an enforcement mechanism attached to them (legal rights) but that 
some quasi-rights may also, wrongly, have an enforcement mechanism attached to them 
(they are nominally ‘legal rights’ but lack moral justification).46  In contrast, against the 
backdrop of a separation thesis treating legal rights as distinct on the basis of their 
authoritative issuance from a social source, authority and normativity do indeed create two 
distinct, but also two incommensurable, classes of rights.  Commitment to the separation 
thesis would indeed bifurcate legal and moral rights, at the expense of also insisting that 
any justification of human rights is entirely beside the point: they are either authoritatively 
issued by a social body or not.
47
  In essence, any attempt to draw normative certainty from 
this juxtaposition is frustrated by the range of background claims that give it meaning.  We 
may be able to justify a conception of the meaning and function of moral and legal rights in 
the context of human rights and use this to identify exemplary instances of such rights.  But 
clearly we are then no longer committed to finding the focal instance of human rights.  We 
are constructing it on the basis of other foundational commitments.      
 
Two related foundational foci emerge from this emphasis on rights: the question of 
correlativity, and the question of giving stable meaning to the contrast of moral and legal 
rights.  This yields, in an important sense, a question of perspective.  Lawyers wish to make 
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sense of there being duty-holders and therefore enforcement, ethicists the possibility of 
human rights having a non-trivial claim to being both rights and moral.  The attempt to 
determine what is required or relevant to human rights’ foundations collapses here into 
whether and how we admit competing epistemological and normative commitments to 
shape our conceptualisation of the phenomenon in question.  
 
 
VI. ‘ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT’ OR ‘SAVING THE PHENOMENON’? 
 
These attempts to narrow the focus of foundational enquiry are not successful 
because they stand in isolation from foundational forms.  They have no supporting 
epistemology able to justify them as more, or less, relevant to ‘human rights properly 
understood’.  That is, none of these lines of enquiry seems to be conceptually authoritative 
or decisive because the characteristics of the class as a whole do not exist independently of 
the claims to necessity found in different foundational forms.  Form and focus are therefore 
separable but also indivisible.  Our normative choices must affect our conceptual choices 
and vice versa.  This is, therefore, to begin to approach the principal question directly: is 
there a mistaken tendency in analysis of human rights towards reductionism?  Has the 
philosophy (and perhaps the grammar) of ‘human rights’ falsely erased crucial divisions 
between human rights laws, ethically defensible human rights, human rights without 
foundations, and so on? 
 
At the very least, a number of methodological choices are in evidence, none are 
theory-neutral, and their prima facie defensibility implies a kind of human rights pluralism.  
We have analysis by definition, focal examples, reconstructions of international practice, 
distinctive human capacities, and moral rights.  These are not only diverse but so 
epistemologically varied as to make the multiple-perspectives position seem ineluctable.  
This position can now be recast as a distinctive methodological choice in theorising about 
human rights, namely to make the choice of focus primary and the form of foundational 
argument secondary.  Different choices of focus can be justified, though such justification 
inevitably also comes at a cost: treating some things generally considered to be human 
rights as failing to be ‘human rights proper’ (for example regional or domestic laws) or 
privileging the perspective of ethicists or lawyers (for example in prioritising moral rights 
or international law).  Acceptance of this cost is the characteristic trait of both anti- and 
deflationary-foundational positions.   
 
But the problem is more acute than this, because concentration on focus reveals the 
many constructive aspects of our understanding of human rights.  It is not simply that the 
foundations of human rights must be thought to imply at least two dominant perspectives, 
but that these are themselves the products of choices and commitments.  Other choices and 
commitments may be possible.  In sum, the problem is more specific than that of multiple 
perspectives but rather that of the essentially contested concept problem.  Our concept is, 
on that account, nothing but the product reconstructive or interpretive practices we are 
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already committed to.
48
  The alternative to this would be commitment to something like 
‘saving the phenomenon’.  That is, demanding characteristics that must be found in any 
defensible foundational reconstruction.
49
  A focus on rights and duty-holders will serve as 
an example of these positions.  
 
In commitment to saving the phenomenon we insist upon certain characteristics that 
must be contained in any ‘recognisable’ account of human rights.  We therefore insist that 
certain characteristics, for example a link with the state and its powers, are conceptually 
necessary in such an account.  But note that, in seeking to insist upon shared and focal 
characteristics, what is being insisted upon is a reasonable, not definitive, account of the 
focus of our concerns.  The characteristic is not necessarily intended to supply a criterion 
for identifying all and only human rights, only to insist that an account of human rights 
without x would fail to reach the standard of being, reasonably, considered an account of 
human rights.  With this commitment we could choose to treat the state, as duty-holder, as 
focal.  This would be amenable to qualified-, deflationary-, and anti-foundationalists.  It 
would challenge any strong foundational argument insisting that correlativity is 
unimportant for foundations.  But, as is implied by the foregoing typology, a strong-
foundational position need not be thought of as synonymous with a rejection of 
correlativity. 
 
Alternatively, human rights as essentially contested suggests that not only are these 
foci artificial –they seek to reduce a phenomenologically and conceptually multifaceted 
concept possessing dynamic real and ideal aspects to a definitive characteristic– but that the 
concept itself only has meaning within various dynamic practices.  The language of human 
rights must take its meaning from its use and from the historical exemplars that dominate 
our thinking.  In this sense the lawyer’s instance that the state as duty-holder is axiomatic 
sits alongside that ethicists’ belief that any duty-holder is possible.  These are different 
worlds and only anti- or deflationary- foundational forms will accept their coexistence 
because of their acceptance of the coexistence of different forms of normative necessity.  
 
Framing this contrast as a contrast between the ‘reductionism’ of saving the 
phenomenon and the interpretive plurality implied by the essentially contested concept 
position, we return again to the question initially posed: have philosophies of human rights 
shown excessive reductionism or do the foundations relevant to human rights admit or 
require more precision than is characteristic of social explanation?  But the choice should 
now be treated as artificially stark.  ‘Foundations’, in relation to any social phenomenon, 
could presumably admit the possibility of both ‘reasonable’ reconstructions and a plurality 
of perspectives.  We can, in other words, reject the essentially contested concept charge if 
this is taken to mean that a plurality of perspectives on human rights entails that no 
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reconstruction of human rights can be reasonable.  Human rights themselves do require and 
admit some precision in the relevant foundational claims, because the potential foci, while 
extensive, are not limitless.  The challenge of foundational analysis is rather to demonstrate 
coherence between focus (the claim that a particular quality must feature within an account 
of human rights) and form (the justification or explanation that renders this necessary).  It is 
precision in this coherence that foundations for human rights demands, not axiomatisation 
nor, conversely, the layers of explanation appropriate to social phenomena more generally. 
 
What types of coherence are possible?  The strong foundationalist needs to insist on 
both saving the phenomenon and a singular, justificatory, perspective.  What it cannot do is 
to claim that this will yield all possible human rights.  To be definitive in that sense implies 
something more than saving the phenomenon.  It implies a link between normative 
necessity and conceptual completeness that the dual requirements of form and focus will 
not admit.  Provided the proponent of strong foundations treats their use of human rights as 
reasonable but not definitive, the essentially contested charge must be rejected for placing 
an artificially high standard on the phenomenological content, and epistemological 
exclusivity, of our attempts at justification. 
 
For this reason, strong and qualified foundational positions are liable to collapse 
together at some points.  On the one hand, both are liable to demand that a reasonable 
account of human rights should include ‘non-correlative’ rights.50  On the other hand, their 
reasons for rejecting the essentially contested charge may be different.  The qualified 
foundationalist is someone who admits multiple perspectives on human rights and their 
foundations, but who also argues that there is a singular phenomenon to be saved even if 
uncertainty will inevitably surround human rights and their foundations.  The strong 
foundationalist argues that, given the reasonableness and coherence of their foundational 
analysis, such uncertainty is a mistaken manifestation of demanding categorical reassurance 
where reasonableness is adequate.  The deflationary foundationalist is defined by rejecting 
the normative singularity of the phenomenon and insisting that a plurality of perspectives is 
permissible.  Foundational claims only capture one, potential, aspect of our 
conceptualisation of an essentially contested concept.  The anti-foundationalist, then, in 
accepting multiple perspectives and an essentially contested concept, in the process rejects 
the idea that the language of foundations captures anything at all. 
 
Consequently, it is not the case that seeking foundations for human rights involves a 
rejection of the explanatory pluralism of social explanation.  No form of foundation 
described here must entail, for instance, that historical narratives of human rights’ 
relationship with democracy and justice are meaningless.  This flows from the 
epistemological claim that no foundational form is tied to the ideal of a definitive 
justification of human rights.  That is, we cannot erase the distinction between form and 
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focus such that foundational necessity alone generates the complete class of human rights: 
we have to make sense of human rights’ history rather than seeing in it a series of failed 
philosophies of human rights.  This also means that the charge of essentially contested 
concept is defused.  Demanding a ‘definitive’ concept of human rights is ruled out in favour 
of a reasonable account.  And the problem itself should be treated as over-stated: no 
existing foundational account, however strong, insists that the class of human rights can be 
determined exclusively a priori, a point stressed even by staunch defenders of Gewirth: 
“legal idealism, even in an optimal social setting, makes no romantic assumption that the 
general acceptance of governing moral principles will mark the end of regulatory conflict 
and controversy, of legal difficultly and dispute.”51   
 
It is inevitable that examples become important, not merely for their illustrative 
function but for the coherence of the foundational project pursued.  The strong foundational 
association with examples like the right to life are precisely the kind of focal example that 
other foundational positions are likely to reject, either as failing to show that a class of 
rights exist or as failing to exhibit the kinds of formal legal limitations that such a right 
would be subject to if legislated or adjudicated.  The question is, however, whether this 
focus is reasonable and sits coherently with the formal, epistemological and normative, 
aspects of the foundational analysis.  Assuming that it is, any further demand that the 
phenomenon be saved can be dismissed as seeking too definitive an account.  In essence, 
this coherence between formal and focal aspects reaches the standard of foundational 
intelligibility without the need for prove that all other conceptualisations are wrong.   
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The requirement of reasonableness and coherence in foundational claims 
demonstrates that analysis of human rights does not differ radically from the methods and 
goals of social explanation tout court.  In either case, we need not accept that all forms of 
explanation are reasonable, and nor need we demand that all reasonable accounts of the 
phenomenon should yield coherent justifications.  However, it is significant that in relation 
to justificatory philosophies of human rights we do not impose a test of how well the 
phenomenon is saved.  It is defensible to have a narrow focus (for instance the right to life 
or international political discourse) and insist that only this has a coherent relationship with 
a conception of necessity.  It is testament to primarily normative significance of human 
rights that whole areas of practice can thereby be defensibly sacrificed on the altar of 
consistency provided that what we are left with can be granted necessity.  So, the methods 
of social explanation may well be useful in analysing the factors that shape the legal, 
political, and linguistic practices that surround human rights.  But it is the province of 
foundational accounts of human rights to seek an account that encompasses coherence and 
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reasonableness in such a way that our normative commitments remain central.  This, 
however, should not be confused with the ‘definitive’ task of offering a justification that is 
able to transcend the phenomenon and become conceptually productive of all human rights 
properly so-called. 
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